of this law are hard to detect because no records of employment by ethnicity are maintained (MacEwen 1994).
In the U.S., on the other hand, the percent of successful discrimination cases is greater, and experts attribute gains in employment and occupational status to policy intervention. Still, most analysts agree that affirmative action has primarily benefitted blacks (Rose 1994; Smith & Welch 1994 ). This situation implies that New Commonwealth immigrants who are indistinguishable from blacks, namely second generation West Indians, will profit most from U.S. equal opportunity initiatives. Therefore, we hypothesize that cross-national policy cifferences are irrelevant to other New Commonwealth peoples.
Ironically, a third argument for a more favorable outcome among excolonials in the U.S. builds on the observation that, despite laws against discrimination, race and ethnicity still affect labor market outcomes. Queuing theory provides an especially useful perspective on how the stereotypes of employers can shape labor market outcomes. Queuing theorists conceive of workers as filling an imaginary queue, with the most desirable workers at the beginning and the least desirable at the end. In the immigrant case, desirability is determined by workers' race, nativity, and birth place, with men and women assumed to occupy separate queues. The relative position a group holds in the eyes of employers becomes salient when otherwise similar workers compete for the same reward. More specifically, employers are expected to give first preference to members of the group they esteem the most, moving down the queue as the supply of more favored groups declines (Hodge 1973; Lieberson 1980) . In a single labor market at a single moment in time, queuing is simply a way of describing how discrimination or favoritism can affect particular groups. In two or more markets, or one market at two or more points in time, the more useful implications of the theoxy become apparent. A key variable is the number of competing groups. If only two groups compete and members of one are consistently ranked above members of the other, then the gap between dominant and subordinate groups across labor markets will be the same, regardless of the size of each group. This is so because, although the subordinate group gains status as its numbers grow, the dominant group gains status at the same rate. If, however, at least one of the labor markets contains three contending groups -say, blacks, browns, and whites, ranked in that order then the presence of blacks benefits browns. Moreover, as the size of the highly stigmatized black group increases, browns benefit more.
For these reasons, Frisbie & Neidert (1977) found that the occupational status of Mexicans improved as the percent of blacks in their labor market grew. More generally, when two or more labor markets each contain several groups, group A will fare best in the labor market that contains the largest proportion of workers belonging to backgrounds less favored than group A.
Following Arnold (1984) and Foner (1985) , the hypothesis tested below is that New York employers will rank African Americans and Puerto Ricans at the bottom of the queue, an option closed to London employers. And those New York groups ranked above these "indigenous American minorities" will enjoy better job outcomes than their compatriots in London. To be sure, the reality is more complex. Employers in the two cities may not rank the groups they share in the same fashion. On the one hand, the British make fewer distinctions among nonwhites than Americans do. Thus, the term black often refers to persons of both Asian and African descent. Brown & Gay (1994) uncovered little difference in the discrimination experienced by South Asian and Caribbean black job applicants. On the other hand, in interviews with West Midlands managers, Jenkins (1986) found most gatekeepers viewed Asians more favorably than West Indians. Nevertheless, if the most stigmatized groups in one labor market (the U.S.) are absent from the second labor market (the U.K.), then workers in the second labor market will have poorer outcomes irrespective of how finely employers distinguish among competing groups.
A final set of theoretical possibilities predicts that native whites and New Commonwealth immigrants have similar outcomes in the two cities. The reasons depend on whether the intercity gap is expected to be zero or to vary consistently within subgroups. The gap would be zero if capitalism fosters universalism, as functionalists have asserted (Blau & Duncan 1967 Another version of cross-national sameness is that U.S.-U.K. differences obtain between but not within groups. Thus, some groups could fare better than whites in both nations, while others fare less well. The only published quantitative analysis of immigrant attainment in the two nations comes to this conclusion. Cheng (1994) uses data from British Labour Force Surveys (1983-89) and the 1980 Public Use Microdata (PUMs) to study the economic well-being of Chinese immigrants. Her dependent variable is the probability of membership in Goldthorpe's service class, the top category in a larger scheme containing seven class locations (Goldthorpe 1987) . Using logistic regression, Cheng concludes that Chinese immigrants in the U.S. and the U.K. have about the same odds of attaining service class membership. In discussing this result, Cheng notes that it contradicts the thesis of American "exceptionalism," just as intergenerational mobility research has done. In fact, cross-national sameness is compatible with several explanations. It might reflect a tendency among host societies to rank migrants similarly, for instance, by skin color, by the mean income of their origin communities, or by the standing of their countries in some worldwide pecking order (Lieberson 1980 ). Yet another possibility is that destinations are relatively unimportant. Identical groups may perform similarly across national boundaries because of similar productive capacities that stem from their cultural legacies (Sowell 1994) .
These alternatives reveal a weakness intrinsic to cross-national immigration studies. Cross-nationally similar results may be due to similarities in premigration characteristics, similarities in postmigration experiences, or both. The design offers no means for adjudicating among these possibilities. Conversely, cross-nationally different results are probably due to group members receiving differential treatment at destination. This interpretation follows because traits at origin are already controlled for.
Or are they? Unfortunately, this assumption may be incorrect. If migrants from the same sending country elect to settle in different places for reasons associated with premigration characteristics, then the value of the cross-national research design diminishes because migrants who choose one country are already systematically different from their compatriots who choose another.
In the present instance the most likely cause of premigration differences is variation in the admissions regulations of the two destinations. On the U.K. side, nonwhite immigration was a direct consequence of the British Nationality Act, which followed Indian independence and gave residents of the Commonwealth and former colonies the right to settle in Britain. The stated goal of the act was to honor a long-standing tradition that colonials were subjects of the mother country (Reitz 1988 ). In fact, however, New Commonwealth immigrants served as replacement labor in the low-paying jobs that native whites no longer wanted or needed to fill (Castles & Kosack 1985) . Following growth in racist sentiment, immigration controls passed in 1962.1 Increasingly restrictive laws followed and kinship to British subjects now defines nearly all New Commonwealth settlers to Britain (Carter, Green & Halpem 1996; Reitz 1988 ).
In the U.S., between 1924 and 1952, most immigrants were Europeans, but with the passage of the McCarran-Walter Act, restrictions were lifted for residents of independent Westem Hemisphere countries and small quotas were granted to colonial dependencies. Quotas were distributed first to those with needed expertise and second to relatives of American citizens. In 1965 new rules were again promulgated. These increased the number of legal immigrants and allocated more slots on the basis of family reunification than of job skills. Subsequent modifications have only modestly reduced the preeminence of kinship ties in the competition for admission (Kraly 1987) . To sum up, because entering the U.S. was harder than entering the U.K. prior to the mid 1960s, immigrants to Britain during the earlier period may have been less skilled than their American counterparts. After 1965, both countries' policies were heavily kinship driven, and any cross-national skill differentials probably eroded rather quickly.
An international difference that is primarily educational is of little consequence because schooling is a measurable and hence controllable characteristic. However, recent theorizing by BorJas (1990 BorJas ( ,1991 suggests that immigrants from identical source nations differ across destinations not only in terms of their measurable skills, but also in terms of their unobserved skills, such as talent, ambition, and diligence. According to BorJas, immigrants are positively selected (of high quality) on unobservables if the income distribution in their homelands is less unequal than the income distribution at destination, while immigrants are negatively selected (of low quality) if the income distribution in their homelands is more unequal than the income distribution at destination. The implication of this logic is that, in the absence of occupational requirements for entry (after 1965 in the U.S., nearly always in the U.K.), newcomers from nations where income is more unequal (i.e., most of the Third World) are negatively selected. Thus, the cohort of immigrants entering the U.S. prior to 1965 may be more positively selected on both observed and unobserved characteristics than the cohort entering Britain in the same period. After 1965, BorJas's theory does not explicitly predict a difference since entry to both nations is primarily on the basis of family ties.
Borjas's findings, however, do not replicate (LaLonde & Topel 1991a, 1991b; Yuengert 1994), and more recently he has conceded that immigration regulations are less significant than nation of origin in determining the quality of immigrant workers (Borjas 1994). We concur that the balance of the evidence suggests little change in the unobserved quality of immigrants from the Third World to the U.S. Nevertheless, unobserved declines in immigrant quality cannot be detected in the cross-sectional data used in this research because information at more than one point in time is required to distinguish aging from cohort effects (Borjas 1991). Nonetheless, in our conclusion, we describe the results of a less stringent test of immigrant quality.
Empirical Analysis

DATA
For London, this study uses the LFS for 1987-93 and for New York, the 1990 PUM's 5% sample. With respect to identifying race/ethnicity/nationality, the data are similar in that they obtain birthplace and some information on ethnic heritage. The foreign born can be categorized more precisely; for example, persons identifying as "Indian" and born in India can be distinguished from persons identifying as "Indian" and born in Africa. In order to enhance comparability among the foreign born, Indians were limited to those bom on the subcontinent, Caribbean Blacks to emigrants from present or past British dependencies, African Blacks to those comnug from south of the Sahara. Moreover, since the purpose of the research was to compare the experiences of similar peoples in the two cities, we decided that meaningful comparison could not proceed for gender/generational subgroups smaller than 100.
Selecting appropriate ages for inclusion in the research was complicated by the tendency for young people in Britain to enter the labor force earlier than American. Experimenting with cut-offs of 18, 21, and 25, we discovered that the younger the minimum age, the smaller the differences between cities. This pattern not only reflected that early school leavers in Britain were less negatively selected than their American counterparts, but also that, in both cities, minority disadvantage increased over the life cycle. Thus, the larger the proportion of youth in the sample, the less difference context made. In order to acknowledge both the shorter educational experience in Britain and the accumulation of minority disadvantage over the life cycle, 21 was selected as the minimum age for inclusion in the analysis.
The following foreign-born nonwhite subgroups contained at least 100 economically active persons, aged 21-64, in both cities: Chinese, African, West Indian, and East Indian men and women, and Bangladeshi and Pakistani men. Of the native born, only West Indian men and women qualified. As for benchmarks, the number of native and foreign-bom non-Hispanic whites in New York was so large that they were sampled so that their size would not overwhelm the analysis. Finally, in order to investigate the relationship between New Commonwealth immigrants and "indigenous minorities" in New York, samples of the city's largest nonwhite groups: African Americans and Puerto Ricans -both Island and Mainland bom, were added to the U.S. analysis.2
VARIABLES AND MODELS
In the absence of information on earnings, our dependent variable is the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI), developed by Ganzeboom, DeGraaf & Treiman (1992). We also undertook some analyses using Treiman's Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale (SIOPS), but, as others have found, we can explain more variance in occupational status than in prestige (Kerckhoff et al. 1989 ). This difference emerges partly because the ISEI is constructed to maximize the indirect effect of education on income via occupation (Ganzeboom, DeGraaf & Treiman 1992; Ganzeboom & Treiman 1996). As a result, ISEI more adequately captures the earnings differentials among occupations than does prestige, a distinction that renders ISEI the more desirable dependent variable for our purposes.
The basic analytic strategy compares the net effects on ISEI of membership in identical ethnic/gender/generation subgroups in New York versus London. Our first step was to estimate additive regressions containing human capital measures and dummies for subgroup membership, separately by city and gender. T tests were used to compare the subgroup coefficients between cities. Next, we supplemented the additive equations with interactions by group membership. These were statistically significant. We therefore estimated separate equations for each subgroup and used those results to decompose the mean difference in ISEI between each minority and whites into portions attributable to coefficient differences, mean differences, and the interaction between the two.
All estimates were run once with native-born whites as the omitted category and once with foreign-born whites. The variables in the models differed slightly by benchmark because the foreign born contrast permitted including two variables human capital theory has found relevant to immigrant success: years of postmigration education and years postmigration (Chiswick 1979 ) Although some analysts include these variables in models containing native-born individuals, their interpretation is not straightforward because all natives and some foreigners can legitimately be assigned a zero on one or both of these measures. The solution, adding a foreign-bom dummy variable, assigns a single, foreign-born effect across immigrant groups, a decision that appears unwarranted in these data. We prefer to estimate a native-born comparison, in which all groups participate, and a foreign-bom comparison, in which only immigrants appear.
As for the coding of the independent variables, a few minor problems deserve mention, and a single major problem requires elaboration. The straightforward human capital measures are age and marital status. Age is used instead of experience because U.S. schooling is reported in intervals rather than years, a fact that taints the usual practice of calculating experience on the basis of age and education. Moreover, since the LFS reports age at which respondents left full-time education rather than years of schooling, an analogous measure is calculated for New Yorkers. This is done by assuming that first grade is entered at age 6 and using Reimers' (1994) coding of years for each schooling interval. Similarly, for U.S. immigrants, year of arrival is reported in intervals. Here, BorJas' (1991) method for coding immigration intervals is followed. These variables permitted estimating years of postmigration education for the relevant cases; all others received a zero on this measure.
A more difficult challenge arises with respect to incorporating education into the analysis. The British system has many more dimensions than the American, including the auspices of schooling (public vs. private), the type of schooling (academic vs. vocational), and the timing of schooling (before or after beginning full-time employment). Researchers comparing the U.S. and U.K. have coped with the educational discrepancies by ignoring them (i.e., using years of completed schooling in the two countries), a decision that enhances the comparability of the regression models (Treiman & Yip 1989) Table 1 presents means and standard deviations on four of the major variables by group membership and city. The youngest group by far is native-born West Indians in London, but among the foreign born, the New Yorkers tend to be the younger. Not only are New York's immigrants younger, but they are more recently arrived. Thus, although Caribbean blacks are the longest resident New Commonwealth immigrants in both cities, those in London disembarked, on average, 25 years ago, those in New York, on average, 15. Interestingly, foreignborn whites in both cities have the same mean length of stay, about 21 years. As for the most recent newcomers, these are New York's Pakistani (8.28 years) and Bangladeshi (7.21) men, the women being too few to analyze. Looking at the summary statistics for "all" reveals that Americans attend school about two years longer than the English. But the longer schooling of New York's native whites accounts for most of this difference, with the result that almost every London minority is more educated than London's native whites, but in New York only East Indian-born men and women fit this description. Moreover, between cities, schooling gaps within the same minority are generally a year or less, with the exceptions of native-born West Indians and foreign-born East Indians, who are considerably more educated in New York. In short, as Reitz (1995) has observed, immigrants to the U.S. appear modestly educated because American natives have many more years of schooling than residents of other developed nations. These trends mislead because they do not control for human capital; thus, several OLS models are estimated. Most take two forms: model 1 contains age of school completion, model 2 age of school completion plus a six-level educational credential variable. Additionally, each model comes in two versions: native-born white contrasts contain all subgroups and exclude immigrationspecific variables, foreign-born contrasts contain only immigrants and include years of postnigration education and years since migration. Table 2 presents the native-born contrast separately by gender. The increase in explained variance between models ranges from 5% to 10%. In London, all subgroups suffer a significant shortfall in both models; in New York a few exceptions appear. In London, the introduction of a second educational control nearly always decreases the penalties for group membership; in New York, the effect on the group membership coefficient of controlling for educational credentials is mixed. The fourth and seventh columns of Evaluating these findings against the theoretical arguments outlined previously, we find against the hypothesis that the U.S. consistently provides the more open opportunity structure. Only half the male groups and none of the female register a New York advantage. As to the benefits of equal opportunity legislation, the failure to uncover a significant intercity difference for second generation West Indian blacks of either sex implies that American social policy does not create an occupationally distinctive New York. This conclusion follows because, as explained above, of the New Commonwealth groups in this study, American-born West Indians are the most likely to profit from antidiscrimination initiatives. Still, these interpretations are based on estimates that do not control for years since migration, a deficiency that gauges the foreign-born experience less accurately than the native. In particular, the greater recency of New York's immigrant population means that the results in Table 2 might understate New Yorkers' advantage. Equations depicting minority coefficients when foreign-born whites constitute the excluded category appear in Table 3 . As might be expected, the penalties for subgroup membership are less in these regressions, a reflection of the smaller gap in mean ISEI between foreign-born whites and nonwhites and of the presence of controls for post migration residence and schooling. Two trends are of special interest: the relative position of foreignbom whites in the occupational hierarchy and the pattern of intercity differences. Again, only the results of model 2 are discussed below.
To explore whether or not queuing could account for the inter-city results, we conducted t tests (not shown), controlling for gender, between the African American coefficient and all others, and between the island-born Puerto
Among men in both cities, foreign-born whites are not consistently the most highly ranked group. Rather, East Indians and Chinese do at least as well; indeed, in New York East Indians hold significantly higher occupations than foreign-born whites, a result not evident in Table 2 . For the Chinese, these shifts mean that the New York advantage identified earlier no longer holds. This change occurs because the gap between New York's native and foreign-born white men is smaller than the gap between London's native and foreign-born white men. Thus, disaggregating the gap between New York's native-born white and foreign-born Chinese males into two parts -a gap between nativeborn whites and a gap between foreign-born whites -renders the second one insignificantly different from its London counterpart. For the East Indians, these shifts do not produce the same result because the gap with foreign-born whites in New York is substantially greater.
Similarly, among women foreign-born whites are not at the top of the foreign-born queue. In New York, Chinese women enjoy significantly higher occupations; in London they attain parity. This situation is reflected in a significant intercity difference (t = 2.07). This change occurs because the gap between New York's native and foreign-born white women is larger than the gap between London's native and foreign-bom white women. Thus, disaggregating the gap between New York's native-bom white and foreign-bom Chinese females into two parts -a gap between native-born whites and a gap between foreign-born whites -renders the second one significantly different from its London counterpart. In addition, a New York advantage emerges for foreign-born West Indian women, a finding to which intercity differences in the gap between native and foreign-born white women do not contribute. In fact, already in Table 2 New York's West Indian women nearly outranked their London sisters (t = 1.91). The larger t value in the foreign-born comparison (t = 3.65) implies that controlling for human capital reduces the shortfall of New York's foreign-born West Indian women. Note that similar reductions do not obtain for New York's foreign-born African women or for either group of foreign-born black females in London. The reasons for this pattern are difficult to assess.
Perhaps the most valuable lesson from the foreign-born comparisons is that better controls do not produce evidence of London advantages despite the longer postmigration experience of nonwhites there. Nonetheless, the results in Tables 2 and 3 contain a potential difficulty, namely the assumption that all groups, immigrants and natives, obtain similar returns on the human capital measures. As a first test of this assumption, we constructed interactions between group membership and age and age at end of full-time schooling. Comparisons of the explained variance between the additive and interactive models revealed significant F ratios in every instance (results available on request). For a few groups, a lower return on age or on education was uncovered, but for most groups both age and education interactions were negative. This exercise indicates that separate equations for each group more appropriately capture the process of occupational attainment. However, interpreting such equations is complex because the disparities between minorities and benchmarks are captured in a set of coefficient differences rather than simply in the intercepts appearing in Tables  2 and 3. To facilitate interpretation, instead of presenting a myriad of group-specific equations, we offer a decomposition of the mean differences in ISEI between minorities and benchmarks. Several methods exist for decomposing mean differences; we select the approach of Jones and Kelley (1984), which has appeared in the ethnic stratification literature (Semyonov 1988 Tables 2 and 3 , but they are not amenable to parametric testing. At the same time, strict attention to significance tests may also mislead because statistical significance is easier to attain in a large sample (i.e., New York) than a small one (i.e., London). Beginning with the men's results, observe that the New York discrimination components are generally smaller in size and narrower in range than those in London. Despite these favorable trends, three of the eight male groups Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and native-born West Indians -suffer more discrimination in New York than in London. In addition, the hierarchy of discrimination (Amold 1984) is different in the two cities. In New York, Chinese, Indian, and white immigrants are at the top, with an occupational deficit of less than a point; the various black groups share the middle with Island-born Puerto Ricans and Pakistanis; and standing alone at the bottom are Bangladeshis. In London, the least disadvantaged males are, surprisingly, native-born West Indians; they are followed immediately by foreign-born whites. The middle consists of Pakistani, East Indian, and Chinese immigrants; the bottom contains Bangladeshis, the foreign-born West Indians, and Africans. The women's group that was previously the strongest contender for a New York advantage, foreign-born West Indians, continues to secure an edge there, but it is small, only 0.4 points (6.86 vs. 7.26). And four of the women's groups -East Indians, foreign-born whites, foreign-born Africans, and native-born West Indians -suffer more discrimination in New York than London. Other trends indicate that, in both cities, the women's pattern is one of large inequalities among minority groups, not, as among men, a narrower range of inequality in New York than London. The hierarchy of discrimination is also similar in the two cities, with native-born West Indians and foreign-born whites at the high end, foreign-born West Indian and African women at the low end. Indeed, this same picture describes London's men. Thus, one way of generalizing across genders is to note that both the hierarchy of discrimination and the size of the Tables 3 and 5 is foreign-born whites; in Tables 2 and 4 , it is native-born whites. And the gap between New York's native and foreign-born women is greater than the gap between London's native and foreign-born women. The opposite situation obtains for men. These distinctions mean that, relative to native whites, New York remains more hospitable to nonwhite men than nonwhite women.
To summarize the data analysis, because omitted variables and differences in slopes might be contaminating the findings in Table 2 , additional equations were estimated. The results of these efforts revealed some intriguing subtleties, but, in the main, the generalizations flowing from the initial work were sustained. New York is the better location for several male groups, a fact potentially related to the lower position of that city's African American and Island-born Puerto Rican men. The results for women are more equivocal; in particular, New York may be more advantageous for foreign-born West Indian women. But more robust support is needed before this conclusion merits acceptance, particularly since New York's African American women hold occupations at least as good as their Caribbean-born sisters.
Discussion
Before exploring the implications of the findings, it is necessary to acknowledge three confounding factors that may bias the results in favor of New York. The first is the underenumeration of minorities and undocumented immigrants. Because New York is home to more such persons than is London, a truly representative sample might yield relatively weaker outcomes for New York. Second, if pre-1965 arrivals to New York are more talented or diligent than their London counterparts, this might account for the superior showing by New York males. Therefore, we tried limiting the U.S. side of the analysis to those arriving after 1965. This strategy produced results almost identical to those reported here, perhaps because over two-thirds of the New York sample arrived after that date. Still, this cross-sectional methodology is not conclusive. Third, during most of this century, the occupational structure of both nations grew at the top and contracted at the bottom. This means that post-1965 arrivals, on average, hold more prestigious occupations than earlier immigrants, a situation which could again favor New York. Unfortunately, continuous occupational scales do not lend themselves to analytic techniques that mitigate this difficulty.
Finally, an intriguing shortcoming may be confounding our ability to discern whether or not queuing is the relevant causal mechanism. Strictly speaking, queuing operates when nonwhites compete for the same jobs. But this assumption rarely holds for an entire labor market (Cross & Waldinger 1992; Waldinger 1992 ). Rather, some immigrants labor in their own ethnic economies, where, most observers assume, they rise to the head of the labor queue regardless of their position in the eyes of dominant group employers (Lieberson 1980) . If this formulation is correct, then to evaluate whether or not queuing is at work requires disaggregating the dominant from the ethnic economy.
Broadly speaking, however, workers apply for the jobs they expect to get. If they pursue positions in the ethnic economy, they do so, at least in part, because queuing has structured the choices available to them.6 Thus, we still interpret our results as relevant to the policy debates that initially motivated this study. Those debates centered around how well nonwhite immigrants have been assimilating into the economies of New York and London. And we find that most groups experience a shortfall in both cities. In addition, a few intercity differences obtain, and these favor New York. The relatively low position of New York's African American and Island-born Puerto Rican men apparently contributes to this New York advantage, but other causal mechanisms may also be involved.
The results for second generation West Indians provide a less ambiguous perspective on assimilation. In both cities these women and men incur an occupational deficit of about two points. Unlike Iganski and Payne (1996), we do not interpret this reduced penalty as good news. Our pessimism is based on research that finds most second generation European Americans suffering no occupational penalty whatever (Featherman & Hauser 1978; Neidert & Farley 1985) . Native-born occupational deficits appear most tenaciously among Puerto Ricans and Mexicans -neither of whom have enjoyed much success in the U.S. economy. A scenario in which Caribbean blacks experience a trajectory similar to that of the more deprived U.S. Latino groups is worrisome. Of course, the U.K. houses few Hispanics, but the fact that London's West Indian and African immigrants consistently rank below Asian immigrants suggests a polarized trajectory may be occurring in that nation as well. In a similar vein, studies of British postcompulsory schooling find that Asians pursue the more academic tracks, Caribbeans and Africans the more vocational (Drew 1995) . These trends imply substantial differences in the life chances of the many backgrounds frequently lumped together as "black Britons." Still, further research is needed before a verdict of nonwhite polarization can be pronounced for either the U.S. or the U.K. We do not know if the conclusions reported here generalize to the level of nations, though we would be surprised were Britain to emerge the more favorable context, at least so far as occupational status is concerned. This brings us to our final point -the need for additional dependent variables. Many British researchers favor Goldthorpe's (1987) categorical measure of social class. Other useful indicators include labor force participation and unemployment rates. But, in our view, the best test of whether or not America is "exceptionally" open to immigrants is a crossnational comparison of earnings. Money, after all, is the ultimate determinant of living standards. And, we suspect that on this outcome, nonwhites in Britain will prove the more fortunate. We make this prediction for two reasons: income polarization is greater in the U.S. than in the U.K. (Ladipo 1995) and, within local labor markets, greater proportions of minorities depress minority earnings (Tienda & Lii 1987) . The significance of the former point is that the earnings gap between whites and nonwhites is probably larger in nations that countenance greater earnings inequality. The significance of the latter is that nonwhites in the U.S. probably share their labor markets with larger proportions of minorities
